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Abstract
We present the first empirical analysis of the relationship between a firm’s
management quality and the prevalence of antitakeover provisions in its cor-
porate charter and their influence on initial public offering (IPO) valuation and
post-IPO performance. We test the implications of the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis, which implies that antitakeover provisions serve only to enhance
the control benefits of incumbent management, and the long-term value creation
hypothesis, which implies that such provisions can enhance value in the hands
of higher quality management. We find that, first, firms with higher quality
management and greater growth options are associated with a greater number
of antitakeover provisions. Second, firms with higher management quality and
a greater number of antitakeover provisions outperform other firms in the
sample in terms of post-IPO operating and stock return performance and obtain
higher IPO valuations. Our findings reject the managerial entrenchment hy-
pothesis and support the long-term value creation hypothesis.
1. Introduction
Why do firms adopt various antitakeover provisions (ATPs) in their corporate
charters and bylaws? How do the presence and strength of such provisions affect
the future stock return and operating performance of firms? The answers to
these questions are controversial, although a number of papers have attempted
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to answer these questions in various contexts (Agrawal and Mandelker 1990;
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). The objective of this paper is to shed new light on
these questions by analyzing, for the first time in the literature, the relationship
between the quality and reputation of a firm’s management and the prevalence
of ATPs in its corporate charter and the relationship between these two variables
and the firm’s valuation and operating and stock return performance using a
sample of firms going public. Initial public offerings (IPOs) of equity are a
particularly appropriate context in which to study these relationships. Many
provisions in a firm’s corporate charter are decided on at the time of going
public, which allows us to study contemporaneously the relationship between
the number of ATPs in a firm’s corporate charter and the quality of the man-
agement team that put these provisions in place.1 In order to analyze that re-
lationship, we test the implications of two alternative theories regarding the
relationship between the quality of a firm’s management and the prevalence of
ATPs and regarding the relationship among management quality, ATPs, and IPO
valuation and post-IPO performance.
The first theory we test is the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. This hy-
pothesis argues that ATPs reduce shareholder value since they entrench managers
by reducing the probability of takeovers by rival management teams and thus
insulate managers from the discipline imposed by the market for corporate
control. Such managerial entrenchment may allow a firm’s management to exert
less effort in running the firm and allow managers to extract more control
benefits. This implies that firms with lower management quality are more likely
to have stronger ATPs in their corporate charters when going public. Further,
this theory implies that regardless of the ability of the management team, stronger
ATPs lead to poorer post-IPO firm performance and lower IPO valuation since
they reduce the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control on firm
management.
While there is some evidence (Field and Karpoff 2002) that ATPs play a role
in entrenching firms’ managers, other evidence indicates that there is more to
the use of ATPs in corporate charters than a blatant attempt to entrench current
management at the expense of shareholders. For example, the empirical evidence
indicates that the use of ATPs in IPOs has increased rather than decreased over
time.2 Further, in contrast to the view that ATPs are value reducing, Field and
Karpoff (2002) do not find any evidence that ATPs at the time of IPO contribute
to poor post-IPO operating performance. In fact, their evidence indicates that
post-IPO operating performance in the years immediately after the IPO is poorer
for firms without takeover defenses than for firms with defenses. In summary,
the management entrenchment hypothesis merits further empirical examination.
1 In contrast, the relationship between management quality and antitakeover provisions (ATPs)
in a firm’s corporate charter is harder to analyze for more seasoned firms because many of these
provisions may have been inherited from previous management teams.
2 For example, Bebchuk (2003) points out that 82 percent of firms going public in 2002 made
use of staggered boards, while only 35 percent of firms going public during 1988–92 did so.
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We propose to accomplish this by studying the relationship between the quality
of a firm’s management and the prevalence of ATPs in its corporate charter.
The second hypothesis we test is the long-term value creation hypothesis
developed by Chemmanur and Jiao (2012). Their theoretical analysis demon-
strates that, in an environment of asymmetric information about management
quality, dual-class share structures and other ATPs may be value enhancing in
the hands of higher quality (more talented) managers. Such ATPs allow managers
to create superior value for the firm by investing in risky long-term projects
without fear of losing control to inferior rivals in a control contest (for example,
in a situation in which the firm’s project is in temporary difficulties). Antitakeover
provisions will be value destroying in the hands of lower quality managers since
they can use such provisions to enjoy the benefits of control without being able
to create any superior long-term value.
The long-term value creation hypothesis implies that firms with more repu-
table managers will be more likely to include stronger ATPs in their corporate
charters, since the ability to create long-term value will dominate any reduction
in the IPO share price imposed by the equity market. Next, among firms with
higher management quality, those with larger growth options will have stronger
ATPs since there is a greater opportunity for value creation in such firms. Further,
for firms with higher quality managers, having stronger ATPs will result in better
post-IPO performance and higher IPO valuation. Thus, we divide a sample of
IPO firms into four groups: firms with high or low management quality, with
each category subdivided into those with a greater or smaller number of ATPs.
The prediction is that firms in the group with high-quality managers and a
greater number of ATPs will have, on average, better post-IPO operating and
stock return performance and higher IPO valuation than firms in the remaining
three groups.3
We test the implications of the two theories using a sample of firms going
public between 1993 and 2000 and making use of measures of management
quality developed by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005). Data on management
quality were hand collected from IPO prospectuses. Data on ATPs in the charters
of firms going public were also hand collected from IPO prospectuses. We study
19 ATPs at the firm level as described in Appendix A.
Our empirical results are as follows. First, firms with higher management
quality have, on average, a greater number of ATPs in their corporate charters.
3 The existing literature also advances a shareholder interest argument for the adoption of ATPs
in corporate charters. Under the shareholder interest hypothesis, ATPs are adopted to increase the
bargaining power of management when dealing with corporate acquisitions, thus yielding higher
takeover premia for selling shareholders: see Comment and Schwert (1995), who document that
ATPs are associated with higher takeover premia, and Linn and McConnell (1983), who document
a positive announcement effect on firms’ equity on the adoption of ATPs. While, like the long-term
value creation hypothesis, the shareholder interest hypothesis also predicts that the adoption of ATPs
increases shareholder wealth, it does not have any predictions for the relationship between the quality
of a firm’s management and the strength of the ATPs in its corporate charter, which is the primary
focus of this paper.
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Second, on average, firms with higher management quality and larger growth
options have significantly more ATPs in their charters compared with all other
firms. We also find that firms with higher management quality and a greater
number of ATPs have, on average, better long-term post-IPO operating and
stock return performance and higher IPO valuation compared with all other
firms.
These results contradict the idea that the role of ATPs in IPO charters is solely
to entrench firm management, for several reasons. First, if this were the case,
one would expect firms with lower quality managers also to have a significant
number of ATPs: in other words, the number of ATPs would not be increasing
in management quality. Second, our finding that the number of ATPs is greater
for firms with higher management quality and larger growth options indicates
that ATPs may help higher quality managers undertake investments in long-
term projects without fear of loss of control, if such projects are in temporary
difficulties, by providing them some insulation from the takeover market. Finally,
our finding that firms with higher quality management and a greater number
of ATPs have better post-IPO performance and higher IPO valuation indicates
that ATPs may be an efficient mechanism that enables higher quality managers
to create greater shareholder value by investing in long-term projects without
being subject to the short-term pressures generated by the market for corporate
control.
Our paper is related to several strands in the literature. The first strand is the
literature analyzing the role of ATPs in the context of various corporate events.
Examples include Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Parrino (1997), who document
that after a firm adopts ATPs, takeovers become less likely and managers tend
to increase their own pay; Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007), who document that
acquirers with more ATPs have lower abnormal returns around the time of
acquisition announcements; Garvey and Hanka (1999), who document that firms
reduce debt levels after adopting ATPs; Hartzell, Kallberg, and Liu (2008), who
use a sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs) to study the relationship
between the corporate governance structure of a firm and its valuation at the
time of IPO; and Field and Karpoff (2002) and Daines and Klausner (2001),
who study ATPs in the context of firms going public. It is important to note
that, while some of these papers investigate the relationship between ATPs in
the corporate charters of firms going public and their subsequent performance,
ours is the first paper that studies the role of management quality in this
relationship.4
The second strand is the literature relating the prevalence of ATPs in a firm’s
corporate charter with shareholder value. A prominent example is Gompers,
4 Our paper is also related to the broader literature that links variation in state antitakeover statutes
and the provisions in corporate debt covenants (see, for example, Qi and Wald 2008). It is also
indirectly related to the literature analyzing the relationship between corporate governance mecha-
nisms characterizing a firm and the incidence of earnings management or earnings restatement (see,
for example, Agrawal and Chadha 2005).
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Ishii, and Metrick (2003), who find that firms with a greater number of ATPs
have lower stock returns. Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006), however, question
the finding, arguing that there is no conclusive evidence that having a greater
number of ATPs causes poorer stock returns. In another related paper, Gompers,
Ishii, and Metrick (2004) study the valuation of dual-class firms (as measured
by Tobin’s q) and document that firm value is increasing in firm insiders’ cash
flow ownership but decreasing in their voting ownership. They recognize, how-
ever, that management quality may be an omitted variable in their analysis. “It
is . . . possible that these results are driven by some outside factor: e.g., val-
uation is driven by some measure of ’management quality,’ and management
quality in turn drives the particular form of dual-class structure adopted across
firms” (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2004, p. 20). To the extent that dual-class
share structures are one of the several ATPs that a firm may include in its
corporate charter, our analysis can be thought of as addressing their concern
regarding the omission of management quality from existing studies.5,6
The third strand is the newly emerging literature on the relationship between
the management quality of a firm and various aspects of its IPO (Chemmanur
and Paeglis 2005) or other financial policies (Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Unlike
the present paper, which studies the relationship between management quality
and the prevalence and effects of ATPs in a firm’s IPO, the focus of Chemmanur
and Paeglis (2005) is on the effects of management quality on IPO characteristics
such as underpricing, underwriting spread, and other costs of going public; that
paper therefore does not address any of the issues that we study here.7
By incorporating management quality in our analysis of the relationship be-
tween ATPs and corporate performance, our paper complements the important
insights provided by the existing literature on why firms adopt ATPs in their
corporate charters. Instead of merely entrenching firm managers and thus always
reducing shareholder value, our analysis indicates that ATPs play a more nuanced
role in affecting shareholder value: while having a greater number of ATPs may
indeed destroy shareholder value in the hands of lower quality managers (possibly
by entrenching them more strongly), we show that ATPs enhance shareholder
value in the hands of higher quality managers. Thus, we provide a more complete
picture of the relationship between ATPs and shareholder value. In particular,
our analysis greatly enhances the understanding of how firms choose various
ATPs to include in their corporate charters when they go public. Further, our
5 There are also a number of other papers studying the rationale for and valuation of dual-class
voting structures in initial public offerings (IPOs). See, for example, Smart and Zutter (2003).
6 There are also a number of event studies of the adoption of ATPs. See, for example, DeAngelo
and Rice (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987), Karpoff and Malatesta (1989), and Bhagat and Jefferis
(1991).
7 The present paper is also related to the broad theoretical and empirical literature on IPOs and
the decision to go public. See, for example, Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Chemmanur (1993), and
Welch (1989) on IPO underpricing and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) on the decision to go
public.
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findings provide a rationale for the fact that the use of ATPs in IPOs has increased
rather than decreased over time.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the relevant
theory and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 describes our data and sample
selection procedure. Section 4 develops our measures of management quality
and reputation and of firm quality and governance (used as control variables in
our analysis). Section 5 presents our empirical tests and results. Section 6 con-
cludes.
2. Theory and Hypotheses
There are two broad sets of theories that have implications for why firms
adopt ATPs and for IPO valuation and post-IPO performance. The first set of
theories can be thought of as emerging from the seminal works of Grossman
and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988, 1989), which imply that dual-
class voting structures and other ATPs are inefficient.8 Their models consider a
setting in which the incumbent management of a firm obtains not only cash
flow or security benefits (arising from her equity ownership in the firm) but
also private benefits from being in control; outside shareholders receive only
security benefits. The models conclude that dual-class voting structures and other
ATPs are value reducing since they reduce the chance of takeovers by rival
management teams who can increase the cash flows to current shareholders by
managing the firm better than the incumbent does. Thus, under these theories,
ATPs are inefficient, and the only role of such provisions is to entrench existing
management and reduce its chance of losing its benefits of control. We refer to
this hypothesis as the managerial entrenchment hypothesis of ATPs.
In contrast, Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) consider a setting in which the
incumbent management of a private firm wishes to sell equity to outsiders in
an IPO to raise external financing for its project. The incumbent obtains both
security benefits (from the equity she owns in the firm) and private benefits of
control. The firm can adopt one of two projects: a long-term project or a short-
term project. A long-term project is intrinsically more valuable than a short-
term project and therefore maximizes long-term value. However, adopting it
may cause the firm’s equity to be undervalued in the short term, since it may
show fewer signs of success in the short run than will a short-term project (in
other words, a long-term project takes a longer time to resolve outsiders’ un-
certainty about a project’s success or failure). Thus, the incumbent has a greater
chance of losing control to potential rivals (even those less able than she) if she
adopts the long-term project and if outside investors believe that the firm’s
project is not progressing well in the short term. Outside investors may vote for
the rival in a control contest and replace the incumbent if the latter does not
8 See also Cary (1969) and Williamson (1975), who made earlier, more informal, arguments that
ATPs act primarily to entrench incumbent management.
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hold enough voting power on her own account to defeat such a rival.9 The
incumbent may be talented or untalented: talented managers have a lower cost
of exerting effort and a comparative advantage in implementing projects than
do untalented managers. The incumbent’s talent is private information: outsiders
observe only a prior probability that she is talented (that is, her reputation or
perceived management quality). In this situation, the incumbent makes a joint
decision about the voting structure and other ATPs in the corporate charter for
her firm’s IPO, the kind of project to adopt (long-term or short-term), and the
extent of effort to exert in implementing this project.
The equilibrium in Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) is driven by the choice made
by a truly talented incumbent (since an untalented incumbent would mimic
such choices in order to not reveal her true type to the equity market). The
choice of a talented incumbent between adopting stronger versus weaker ATPs
depends on three effects. First, the insulation from the takeover market provided
by stronger ATPs would allow the incumbent to create more value by imple-
menting a long-term rather than a short-term project. Second, such insulation
also allows untalented incumbents to slack off by not exerting effort, thus dis-
sipating value without any fear of losing control to potential rivals. Since equity
markets cannot perfectly distinguish between talented and untalented incum-
bents, this loss-of-discipline effect is also reflected in the talented incumbent’s
firm’s IPO share price if she adopts stronger ATPs (and favors her adopting
weaker ATPs instead). Third, regardless of the kind of project adopted, there is
a greater chance for incumbent management to maintain control under a cor-
porate charter with stronger ATPs.
Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) show that when the reputation of incumbent
management is high enough and the firm has greater opportunities for long-
term value creation, in equilibrium, management would adopt an IPO charter
with stronger ATPs. This is because the long-term value creation effect dominates
any reduction in IPO share value arising from the loss of discipline effect, and
such stronger ATPs will in fact be value enhancing for shareholders. We refer
to this hypothesis of ATPs as the long-term value creation hypothesis.
The long-term value creation hypothesis leads to two testable predictions
regarding the prevalence of ATPs in IPO firms’ corporate charters. The first
prediction is that, on average, higher quality managers will adopt corporate
charters with a greater number of ATPs, which generates the first hypothesis
that we test.
Hypothesis 1. Firms with higher quality management will be associated with
a greater number of ATPs.
9 Stein (1988) has a model of corporate myopia in which takeover pressure under asymmetric
information may make managers invest in short-term rather than in (higher value) long-term projects.
However, unlike in Chemmanur and Jiao (2012), there is no role for management quality in the
Stein (1988) analysis, so it does not have implications for the relationship between management
quality and ATPs.
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Notice that this is in direct opposition to the prediction of the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis. While models of managerial entrenchment do not
incorporate different levels of management quality, allowing for such variation
in quality would imply that firms with less able management teams are more
likely to have a greater number of ATPs under the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis. This is because higher quality managers will be more able to resist
future takeover attempts based on attracting votes from outside shareholders in
a control contest, so lower quality managers will benefit more from (and therefore
will adopt) a greater number of ATPs in their corporate charter.
The second prediction of the long-term value creation hypothesis is that among
the firms with higher management quality, those with greater opportunity for
long-term value creation (that is, larger growth options) are more likely to adopt
a greater number of ATPs in their corporate charters. We divide the IPO sample
into four groups based on management quality and growth options: higher
management quality with larger growth options (group 1), higher management
quality with smaller growth options (group 2), lower management quality with
larger growth options (group 3), and lower management quality with smaller
growth options (group 4). The prediction is that firms in group 1 will have the
greatest number of ATPs (since they have the greatest opportunity for value
creation) and that firms in group 4 will have the least number of ATPs (since
they have the least opportunity for long-term value creation), which generates
the second hypothesis that we test.
Hypothesis 2. Firms with higher quality management and larger growth
options will be associated with the greatest number of ATPs, and firms with
lower quality management and smaller growth options will be associated with
the fewest ATPs.
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts no direct relationship between
the extent of growth options available to a firm and the strength of ATPs in its
corporate charter.
The long-term value creation hypothesis also has predictions for the rela-
tionship among management quality, ATPs, and the post-IPO performance and
IPO valuation of firms going public. Since under the long-term value creation
hypothesis, having a greater number of ATPs is, in fact, value enhancing for
firms with higher quality managers, the prediction is that there will be a positive
relationship between the number of ATPs and post-IPO operating performance
for such firms. We divide our IPO sample into four categories based on man-
agement quality as well as ATPs: higher management quality with stronger ATPs,
higher management quality with weaker ATPs, lower management quality with
stronger ATPs, and lower management quality with weaker ATPs. We predict
that the post-IPO operating performance of firms in the category with higher
management quality and stronger ATPs will, on average, be significantly better
Management Quality and Antitakeover Provisions 659
than that of firms in the remaining three categories.10 Further, if investors an-
ticipate the better operating performance of firms with higher management
quality and stronger ATPs, the IPO valuation of this group will be higher than
that of firms in the remaining three categories. Finally, since long-term post-
IPO stock returns generally move together with post-IPO operating performance,
the long-term value creation hypothesis also implies that firms in the first cat-
egory would, on average, outperform those in the remaining three categories in
terms of long-term post-IPO stock returns.11 Thus, we test the following three
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3. Post-IPO operating performance of firms with higher quality
management and a greater number of ATPs will be better than that of firms in
the rest of the sample.
Hypothesis 4. The IPO valuation of firms with higher quality management
and a greater number of ATPs will be higher than that of firms in the rest of
the sample.
Hypothesis 5. Long-term post-IPO stock return performance of firms with
higher quality management and a greater number of ATPs will be better than
that of firms in the rest of the sample.
In contrast, the predictions of the managerial entrenchment hypothesis re-
garding the relationship between management quality and ATPs on the one hand
and IPO valuation, post-IPO operating, and stock return performance on the
10 Note that, in the setting of Chemmanur and Jiao (2012), all four combinations will arise in
equilibrium. This is because the number of ATPs included in a firm’s corporate charter depends on
the trade-off between the short-term and the long-term effects on top management’s objective of
including them in the corporate charter: while including a larger number of ATPs will lead to a
lower short-term IPO share price (because of the loss-of-discipline effect discussed earlier), it will
lead to a better long-term operating (and stock return) performance. Thus, we will observe both
high-management-quality firms with stronger ATPs and high-management-quality firms with weaker
ATPs. Further, since the equilibrium in Chemmanur and Jiao (2012) is a pooling equilibrium in
which high- and low-management-quality firms pool together in the IPO market, we will also find
low-management-quality firms with stronger ATPs and low-management-quality firms with weaker
ATPs in their corporate charters.
11 If outside investors are fully rational and the stock market is completely efficient, one should
not observe any differences in the postissue long-run stock return performance of IPO firms with
higher management quality and stronger ATPs versus the rest of the sample. If higher management
quality and stronger ATPs increase the likelihood of long-term value creation, such information will
be reflected in IPO offer price on the issue date: in other words, there will be no differences in the
long-run returns measured subsequent to the issue date. If, however, investors are only boundedly
rational, so this information is not fully reflected in the IPO offer price but is incorporated only
over a longer period, then one would expect better long-run stock return performance from firms
with higher management quality and stronger ATPs. Note that all long-run stock return studies
around corporate events require the assumption of bounded rationality or limited market efficiency
similar to the one we make here. One may consider this to be a strong assumption, but, given the
large empirical literature documenting the postevent drift following earnings announcements and
many other corporate events (see, for example, Foster, Olsen, and Shevlin 1984; Bernard and Thomas
1989), one has to at least consider the possibility that the information revealed by many corporate
actions is not always instantaneously reflected in the stock price.
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other are as follows. Given that it may lose control of its firm through a takeover,
incumbent management will work harder to manage the firm and attract votes
from outside shareholders if the probability of a successful takeover is greater.
(See Chemmanur and Yan [2004] for a model that includes effort choice by
incumbent management and incorporating the disciplinary effect of takeovers.)
Since stronger ATPs reduce the chance of such credible takeover attempts from
succeeding (that is, they reduce the threat of takeovers), the managerial en-
trenchment hypothesis implies that, regardless of management quality, firms with
stronger ATPs will have poorer post-IPO operating performance, since incum-
bent management (whether of high or low quality) is likely to work less hard
in such firms. Further, if investors rationally anticipate that firms with stronger
ATPs will have poorer post-IPO operating performance, the managerial en-
trenchment hypothesis implies that such firms will have lower IPO valuations
as well. Finally, since long-term stock returns generally move hand in hand with
operating performance, the managerial entrenchment hypothesis also implies a
negative relationship between the prevalence of ATPs in a firm’s IPO corporate
charter and post-IPO stock returns.
3. Data and Sample Selection
The list of IPOs of common equity between 1993 and 2000 comes from the
Security Data Company (SDC)/Platinum Global New Issues database. After elim-
ination of REITs, closed-end funds, unit offerings, equity carve outs, financial
firms (all firms with Security Industry Classification [SIC] codes between 6000
and 6999), foreign companies, previous leveraged buyouts, roll ups, firms not
found in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and/or Compustat
Industrial Annual databases, and firms for which CRSP and SDC show different
first dates of trading, we are left with 2,644 firms in our sample.12
In order to isolate the effects of management quality on IPO performance
and valuation, and to remove any confounding effects arising from the presence
of venture capitalists (VCs) or institutional investors as firm backers, we confine
our study to non-VC-backed firms and those with no institutional investors
prior to the IPO. In addition to the direct effect of VCs on IPO performance
and valuation (through VC certification), VCs can affect the management quality
of IPO firms either by selecting managers or by performing various roles (for
example, legal representation, selection of underwriters) that would be performed
by management in non-VC-backed firms. (See, for example, Hellmann and Puri
[2002], who find that VCs play a significant role in the professionalization of
start-up firms in general and in the hiring of their top managers in particular.)
Similar arguments apply to institutional investors as well. We therefore eliminate
VC-backed firms and firms that have shareholdings (greater than 5 percent) by
12 We did not explicitly screen out firms with offer prices below $5. However, we have only 29
such firms in our sample. Excluding these firms does not alter our results.
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Table 1
Initial Public Offerings by Year
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Total 615 516 539 792 473 307 499 376 4,117
Unit offerings 91 108 85 119 24 12 2 3 444
Equity carve outs 98 68 40 64 36 26 39 30 401
Financial firms 48 29 31 62 71 67 44 10 362
Foreign firms 10 4 17 25 3 1 34 37 131
Former leveraged buyouts 40 12 10 12 3 0 0 5 82
Roll ups 0 0 2 8 7 9 2 1 29
CRSP/Compustat not available 3 4 1 4 3 2 1 1 19
Unclear first date of trading 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 5
Venture backed 128 106 169 253 155 100 288 239 1,438
Significant shareholders 72 60 82 108 51 38 45 31 487
Final sample 125 123 102 136 119 52 44 18 719
Note. CRSP p Center for Research in Security Prices.
financial institutions and corporations prior to the IPO (unless these entities are
explicitly mentioned as wholly owned by firm insiders). This leaves us with 719
IPOs. (The information about shareholders is from the principal shareholders
section of the IPO prospectuses.) Table 1 shows how we arrived at our final
sample.
Various measures of management quality were hand collected from IPO pro-
spectuses obtained from the Thomson Financial database. In particular, infor-
mation on management team size and education level, former managerial ex-
perience, and tenure of the team members is from the management section of
the prospectuses. Information on ATPs and internal governance mechanisms
(such as chief executive officer [CEO]/chairman of the board duality, proportion
of outside directors, and insider stock ownership) are obtained from the IPO
prospectuses as well. Finally, stock returns are from CRSP, and accounting data
are from Compustat.
4. Measures of Management Quality and Reputation and Firm Quality
4.1. Management Quality and Reputation
We use the following variables to measure the quality and reputation of a
firm’s management. First, management quality is affected by the amount of
human and knowledge resources (including education and relevant work ex-
perience) available to a firm’s management. This is measured by the number of
executive officers and vice presidents on a firm’s management team (TSIZE).
Further, management quality depends on the education of management team
members, which provides our second and third measures of management quality.
We measure education in two ways, first, as the percentage of the management
team with a master’s of business administration (MBA) degree (PMBA) and,
second, as the percentage of management team members who are certified public
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accountants (PCPA). Higher percentages of MBAs and CPAs imply higher man-
agement quality.
Another contributing factor that increases management quality is relevant
work experience, which provides our fourth and fifth measures of management
quality. We measure work experience in two ways. First, we look at the percentage
of management team members who have served as executive officers and/or vice
presidents at other firms prior to joining the IPO firm (PFTEAM). Second, we
look at the percentage of team members who have previously been partners in
a law or accounting firm (PLAWACC). Clearly, expertise in law and accounting
can be a useful asset to the firm at the time of going public and subsequently.
In summary, the greater the value of these variables, the better the management
quality.
The sixth measure of management quality we use is CEO dominance. On the
one hand, a strong CEO may improve the cohesion of the management team.
On the other hand, a strong-willed and dominating CEO may severely diminish
possible contributions from other team members. Thus, while we believe that
CEO dominance is an important measure of team quality, we are agnostic about
the direction of the expected impact (positive or negative) of this measure. Our
measure of CEO dominance is the ratio of CEO salary and bonus to the average
salary and bonus of other team members listed in the executive compensation
section of the prospectus in the fiscal year preceding the IPO (FCEO). Assuming
that CEOs have a substantial influence over their own pay and nearly total
influence over their subordinates’ pay, this measure reflects the gap between the
CEO’s assessment of his own worth to the firm and his assessment of other
team members’ worth and is thus a good measure of CEO dominance.13
The seventh measure of management quality we use is the median tenure of
the management team (TENURE), defined as the median number of years that
team members have served with a firm. Longer median tenure may indicate
cohesion and shared experiences and thus would imply lower transaction costs
among team members.
However, longer tenures may also indicate the presence of complacency and
rigidifying effects on team interactions. An ideal team would have members from
different cohorts, which would allow for an inflow of new ideas and perspectives.
Thus, higher management quality will be associated not only with a longer
median tenure but also with a higher dispersion of tenures. Our eighth measure
of management quality, therefore, is tenure heterogeneity, defined as the coef-
ficient of variation of the team members’ tenures (TENHET).
Table 2 summarizes our measures of management quality. The average (me-
dian) management team size (TSIZE) was 5.4 (5), with the smallest team con-
sisting of only one person and the largest one of 15 members. On average, 7.5
13 Similar measures have been used in the strategy and organizational behavior literature to study
the effect of management team quality on firm performance. D’Aveni (1990) and Hambrick and
D’Aveni (1992) use such measures to study the deterioration of management team quality around
bankruptcies.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics of Management Quality Variables for Firms with
Initial Public Offerings 1993–2000
N Mean Median Min Max SD
TSIZE 719 5.424 5.000 1.000 15.000 2.223
PMBA 719 .075 .000 .000 .800 .145
PCPA 719 .118 .077 .000 .833 .141
PFTEAM 719 .381 .333 .000 1.000 .277
PLAWACC 719 .031 .000 .000 .750 .088
FCEO 711 1.381 1.259 .000 5.425 .584
TENURE 719 6.482 5.000 1.000 30.500 5.239
TENHET 718 2.172 .940 .000 22.854 2.911
MQFACT 711 .000 .099 1.311 3.132 .703
percent of managers had an MBA degree (PMBA), 11.8 percent were CPAs
(PCPA), 38.1 percent had held a top management position at another firm prior
to joining the IPO firm (PFTEAM), and 3.1 percent have been a partner in a
law or accounting firm (PLAWACC). On average, CEOs were earning 38.1 percent
more than the average member of their management team (FCEO). The median
tenure ranged from 1 to 30.5 years, with a mean (median) of 6.5 (5.0) years.
Although these variables are expected to measure management quality and
reputation, they may have unique limitations as a measure of the underlying
unobservable construct. Thus, we use common factor analysis to construct a
single variable for management quality that captures variation common to the
various observable proxies of management quality.14 In order to ensure that this
common factor captures only the effect of management quality and not that of
firm quality variables such as firm size, we use firm-size-adjusted variables to
extract that factor.15 The management quality factor score (MQFACT) is obtained
using common factor analysis on firm-size-adjusted TSIZE, MBA, CPA, FTEAM,
LAWACC, and FCEO. These variables refer, respectively, to the number of man-
agement team members, the number of MBAs on the management team, the
number of CPAs on the management team, the number of team members with
prior managerial experience at other firms, the number of team members who
served as partners in law and accounting firms, and CEO dominance. Table 2
reports summary statistics of MQFACT.
We exclude TENURE and TENHET from this common factor analysis since
these variables, unlike the others, have negative factor loadings and negative
scoring coefficients if included in the factor analysis. The interpretation of
14 A number of papers in the empirical finance and accounting literature make use of factor analysis
to isolate the unobservable construct underlying several proxy variables. See, for example, Gaver and
Gaver (1993) and Guay (1999), who make use of factor analysis to study the size of a firm’s investment
opportunity set.
15 We adjust management quality variables for firm size by regressing each variable on firm size
and then using the residuals from these regressions (that is, variation in management quality variables
not explained by firm size) as firm-size-adjusted proxies of the management quality variables.
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Table 3
Common Factor Analysis of Measures of Management Quality










MQFACT becomes problematic when some individual management quality var-
iables have positive scoring coefficients and others have negative scoring coef-
ficients. Thus, we restrict our common factor analysis to the first six individual
management quality variables, since these have positive factor loadings and pos-
itive scoring coefficients, and use TENURE and TENHET as control variables
in our multivariate analyses.16
Table 3 reports the results of this common factor analysis. It presents estimated
starting communalities, calculated as the squared multiple correlations obtained
from regressing each of the management quality measures on the other measures
used in the factor analysis. As suggested by Harman (1976), the number of
factors needed to approximate the original correlations among individual mea-
sures is equal to the number of summed eigenvalues needed to exceed the sum
of communalities. The sum of communalities is .6213, which is less than the
eigenvalue for the first factor in the factor analysis (.7980), which suggests that
one factor parsimoniously explains the intercorrelations among the individual
measures. Table 3 also reports the correlations between MQFACT and the original
measures of management quality.
4.2. Proxies for Other Aspects of Firm Quality and Internal
Governance and Control Variables
In order to separate the effects of management quality and reputation from
those of other dimensions of firm quality and internal governance, we control
for these other dimensions using the following proxies.17
16 The negative factor loadings and negative scoring coefficients for TENURE and TENHET are
driven mostly by the negative correlations between TENURE and TENHET and other management
quality variables such as the percentage of management team members with prior managerial ex-
perience at other firms and the percentage of management team members with MBA degrees (the
correlation coefficients between TENURE [TENHET] and PFTEAM are .52 [.20], and the cor-
relation coefficients between TENURE [TENHET] and PMBA are .05 [.03]). Indeed, managers
who have longer tenures with a firm are more likely to be bred internally rather than invited from
outside and, thus, are less likely to have prior managerial experience at other firms. Similarly, managers
who have spent a greater number of years with a firm are more likely to acquire their managerial
skills internally rather than externally at an educational institution.
17 Similar proxies are used by Field and Karpoff (2002), a study of takeover defenses of IPO firms.
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First, a common firm quality variable used in many IPO studies is firm size.
We use the natural logarithm of the book value of a firm’s assets immediately
prior to its IPO as a proxy for the firm size (LNBVA). The larger the firm, the
higher the firm quality.18 Second, we control for the proportion of outside di-
rectors (directors who are listed in the management section of the prospectus
and are not executive officers of the company, founders, former employees, or
anyone who is engaged in any kind of business dealings with the firm) on the
board of directors (ODIR). There are two ways in which outside directors can
influence firm quality. They may provide additional knowledge (inputs and per-
spectives) to the firm’s management. They also provide linkages to external
parties, such as underwriters, financial institutions, and auditors. The greater
the proportion of outside directors, the higher the firm quality.19
Third, we control for insider stock ownership, defined as a proportion of
voting power owned by executive officers and directors both before and after
(depending on the particular analysis we conduct) the IPO (INSIDERB and
INSIDERA, respectively). Sufficiently large insider stock ownership may serve
as a substitute for ATPs. Fourth, we control for CEO/chairman of the board
duality (BOSS). This dummy variable is equal to one if a firm’s CEO is also a
chairman of its board of directors and zero otherwise. Separation of the roles
of a CEO and a chairman of the board creates greater management accountability
and improves internal governance and firm quality.20 Fifth, we control for un-
derwriter reputation, since underwriters care for their reputation with potential
buyers of IPO shares and may bargain with IPO firms to include optimal pro-
visions in their corporate charters. Our underwriter reputation measure (REP)
is the lead underwriter’s share of the total proceeds raised by all IPOs in 1993–
2000 (similar to Megginson and Weiss [1991]).
Sixth, we control for a firm’s growth options measured as the ratio of the
sum of capital expenditures and research and development expenses to the book
value of assets prior to IPO (CERDA). We control for growth options since,
according to our long-term value creation hypothesis, firms with higher quality
managers that have greater growth options are more likely to use ATPs to shield
themselves from unwanted takeover attempts and implement long-term value-
creating projects (hypothesis 2). Seventh, we control for a firm’s leverage (LEV-
ERAGE), which is the ratio of long-term debt to the book value of assets prior
to IPO.21 Eighth, we control for the existence of state-level ATPs (STATELAW),
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the state in which an IPO firm is
18 This measure of firm quality has been widely used in the literature (see, for example, Ritter
1984; Michaely and Shaw 1994).
19 Some studies in the corporate control literature show that outside directors enhance firm value
(see, for example, Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner 1997; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani 1996).
20 See, for example, Yermack (1997), who shows that firms that separate the roles of a chief executive
officer (CEO) and a chairman of the board receive higher valuation, and Rechner and Dalton (1991),
who show that such firms outperform those with combined roles of CEO and chairman.
21 Field and Karpoff (2002) argue that a firm’s leverage, like its size, may have an effect on its
vulnerability to takeovers and on the value of ATPs to it.
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Table 4
Summary Statistics of Firm Quality and Other Control Variables
for Firms with Initial Public Offerings 1993–2000
Mean Median Min Max SD
LNBVA 16.726 16.843 12.064 23.810 1.543
ODIR .313 .333 .000 1.000 .264
INSIDERB .813 .900 .056 1.000 .219
INSIDERA .564 .592 .010 .983 .185
BOSS .730 1.000 .000 1.000 .444
REP .016 .001 .000 .175 .037
CERDA .201 .081 .000 5.985 .450
LEVERAGE .239 .140 .000 6.378 .400
STATELAW .921 1.000 .000 1.000 .270
DELAWARE .452 .000 .000 1.000 .498
Note. .Np 719
incorporated has at least one state ATP described in Appendix A and zero
otherwise. We include this variable since state ATPs can serve as substitutes for
firm-level ATPs (see, for example, Karpoff and Malatesta 1989; Field and Karpoff
2002). Finally, we include a dummy variable equal to one if an IPO firm is
incorporated in the state of Delaware and zero otherwise (DELAWARE). Since
45 percent of IPO firms in our sample are incorporated in Delaware, we include
this variable to control for the effect that Delaware corporate legislation may
have on the likelihood of adopting ATPs. Table 4 summarizes our measures of
firm quality, internal governance, and control variables.
5. Empirical Tests and Results
5.1. Relationship between Management Quality and the
Prevalence of Antitakeover Provisions
The long-term value creation hypothesis predicts that higher quality managers
will be more likely to have a greater number of ATPs in their firms’ corporate
charters prior to going public, insulating themselves from unwanted takeover
bids and implementing long-term value creating projects (hypothesis 1). The
managerial entrenchment hypothesis, however, predicts the opposite: lower qual-
ity managers will be more likely to adopt a greater number of ATPs in their
firms’ corporate charters prior to going public, insulating themselves from the
market for corporate control and consuming private benefits of control. We first
present the results of our univariate tests and then analyze these relationships
using multivariate regressions.
5.1.1. Univariate Tests
Table 5 reports the frequencies of individual firm-level ATPs for our sample
of IPO firms and the results of our univariate tests of the relationship between
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the quality of a firm’s management and the prevalence of ATPs. (Firm-level ATPs
are described in Appendix A.)
First of all, it is worth noting that the frequencies of most of the firm-level
ATPs in our sample of IPO firms in 1993–2000 increased sharply compared with
the frequencies reported by Field and Karpoff (2002) for their sample of IPO
firms in 1988–92. This finding provides further evidence that over time IPO
firms increased the use of ATPs in their corporate charters as reported in previous
studies (see, for example, Bebchuk 2003).22 For example, frequencies of the
following ATPs almost doubled from the 1988–92 sample to the 1993–2000
sample: a restriction on the ability of common shareholders to call shareholder
meetings (from 15.4 to 37.3 percent), an advance-notice requirement to call
shareholder meetings (from 19.1 to 41.2 percent), unequal voting rights (from
5.4 to 10.3 percent), and a requirement to remove directors only for cause (from
12.8 to 24.5 percent). There is also a sizeable increase in the frequencies of such
provisions as a staggered/classified board (from 36.2 to 43.5 percent), a blank-
check preferred stock (from 85.1 to 93.6 percent), a stakeholder clause (from
4.0 to 7.0 percent), a restriction on action by written consent (from 23.0 to 26.0
percent), and a supermajority required to approve mergers (from 9.2 to 13.8
percent). On the other hand, frequencies of some other provisions decreased,
for example, a supermajority required to replace directors (from 27.3 to 14.3
percent), a fair-price provision (from 9.7 to 3.5 percent), and a poison pill (from
2.3 to 1.4 percent).
To study the relationship between management quality and ATPs, we split our
sample by the median management quality factor score and compare the fre-
quencies of ATPs in these subsamples. We refer to the firms with below median
management quality factor scores as “low-management-quality firms” and those
with above median management quality factor scores as “high-management-
quality firms.”
We find that management quality significantly affects the prevalence of ATPs
in IPO firms. In particular, high-management-quality firms have significantly
more ATPs regulating shareholder meetings. For example, the proportions of
high-management-quality firms with a restriction on the ability of common
shareholders to call shareholder meetings, with an advance-notice requirement,
and with a restriction on action by written consent are greater by about 10
percentage points than those of low-management-quality firms with the same
provisions. These differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Further, the proportions of high-management-quality firms with a staggered
board and a supermajority requirement to remove directors are significantly
larger than those of low-management-quality firms with the same provisions.
These differences are significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. On
22 The median book value of assets prior to IPO reported by Field and Karpoff (2002) is $27.7
million, while it is $20.7 million for our sample. This indicates that these two samples are roughly
comparable and the differences in reported frequencies of ATPs cannot be attributed to differences






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































670 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
the other hand, the proportion of high-management-quality firms with anti-
greenmail provisions is significantly smaller than that of low-management-quality
firms.
Table 5 also reports the means and medians of the total number of firm-level
ATPs (1–19 in Appendix A). Firms with high-quality management teams have
a significantly greater total number of ATPs than do firms with low-quality
management teams. The mean (median) total number of ATPs of firms with
above median management quality factor scores is 4.51 (4), and it is 4.11 (3)
for firms with below median management quality factor scores; these differences
are significant at the 5 percent level.
Our univariate tests in Table 5 indicate that higher management quality is
associated with more ATPs in IPO firms, which provides support for the long-
term value creation hypothesis (hypothesis 1) and contradicts the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis.
5.1.2. Multivariate Tests
To study the relationship between management quality and the prevalence of
ATPs in IPO firms, we estimate the following Poisson maximum-likelihood
specification:
ATPp b  b TSIZE  b PMBA  b PCPA  b PFTEAM  b PLAWACCi 0 1 i 2 i 3 i 4 i 5 i
 b FCEO  b TENURE  b TENHET  b CERDA  b INSIDERB6 i 7 i 8 i 9 i 10 i (1)
 b ODIR  b BOSS  b LNBVA  b LEVERAGE  b REP11 i 12 i 13 i 14 i 15 i
 b STATELAW b DELAWARE  YEAR  IND   ,16 i 17 i i i i
where the dependent variable is the total number of ATPs that a firm has prior
to its IPO.23 The terms YEAR and IND are year and industry (two-digit SIC
code) dummies.
Regression 1 in Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1).
We find that TSIZE, PMBA, and PCPA have a positive and significant impact
on the total number of ATPs in IPO firms. The coefficient estimates of these
independent variables are significant at the 5 percent level (except for PMBA,
which is significant at the 1 percent level). We also find that firms with more
23 It can be argued that unequal voting rights are significant takeover deterrents by themselves,
and insiders of firms with unequal voting rights may not need additional ATPs for takeover protection.
For example, in our sample, firms with unequal voting rights have significantly lower frequencies
of staggered boards, restrictions on action by written consent, and requirements for directors to be
removed for cause. However, at the same time, firms with unequal voting rights have significantly
higher frequencies of requirements for meetings to be called only by directors or executives, advance-
notice requirements, and restrictions on transfer of common stock. There are no statistically significant
differences in frequencies of other ATPs between firms with versus without unequal voting rights.
(These results are available on request.) This indicates that firms with unequal voting rights do adopt
other ATPs in their corporate charters. Nevertheless, we repeated our analysis, excluding firms with
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dominating CEOs (FCEO) have a greater number of ATPs. The coefficient es-
timate of this variable is significant at the 10 percent level. These results are also
economically significant. For a firm with the median number of four ATPs,
increases of 1 standard deviation in management team size (TSIZE) and the
percentage of MBAs in a management team (PMBA) lead to an increase in the
number of ATPs by .21; this represents a 5.2 percent increase over the median
number of ATPs. In addition, for a firm with the median number of four ATPs,
an increase of 1 standard deviation in the percentage of CPAs in a management
team (PCPA) and CEO dominance (FCEO) lead to increases in the number of
ATPs by .18 and .14, respectively; these represent increases of 4.2 and 3.5 percent
over the median number of ATPs, respectively.
In regression 2, we replace individual management quality variables with
MQFACT. This regression also shows a significant positive relationship between
management quality and the number of ATPs; the coefficient estimate of
MQFACT is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. For a firm with the
median number of four ATPs, an increase of 1 standard deviation in MQFACT
leads to an increase in the number of ATPs by .19; this represents a 4.9 percent
increase over the median number of ATPs.
In regressions 3 and 4, we drop STATELAW and DELAWARE and estimate
state-of-incorporation fixed-effects models. The results are qualitatively similar
to those of regressions 1 and 2; TSIZE, PMBA, PLAWACC, and MQFACT have
a positive and significant effect on the total number of ATPs.
Next we repeat the analysis using logit regressions with a dependent variable
equal to one if an IPO firm has four or more ATPs (firms with stronger anti-
takeover protection) and zero otherwise (firms with weaker antitakeover pro-
tection).24 The results of these logit regressions (regressions 5–8) confirm the
results of our Poisson maximum-likelihood estimations. In regression 5, with
individual management quality variables, PMBA, PCPA, TSIZE, and FCEO have
a positive and significant impact on the prevalence of ATPs in IPO firms. The
coefficient estimates of PMBA and PCPA are significant at the 1 percent level,
and the coefficient estimates of TSIZE and FCEO are significant at the 5 percent
level. These results are also economically significant. For a firm facing equal
probabilities of having stronger versus weaker antitakeover protection, increases
of 1 standard deviation in PMBA, PCPA, TSIZE, and FECO lead to increases of
6.9, 6.3, 6.0, and 5.3 percentage points in the probability of having stronger
antitakeover protection, respectively.
In regression 6, we use MQFACT in place of individual management quality
variables; MQFACT has a positive and significant influence on the prevalence
of ATPs, with its coefficient estimate significant at the 1 percent level. For a firm
facing equal probabilities of having stronger versus weaker antitakeover protec-
24 We use four or more ATPs as a cutoff number since it roughly divides the sample into two
equal parts: there are 338 firms in our sample with three or fewer ATPs in their corporate charters
and 381 firms with four or more ATPs in their corporate charters. Our results are generally robust
to other cutoff numbers.
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tion, an increase of 1 standard deviation in the management quality factor score
leads to an increase of 7.0 percentage points in the probability of having stronger
antitakeover protection.
In regressions 7 and 8, we drop STATELAW and DELAWARE and estimate
state-of-incorporation fixed-effects models. The results are qualitatively similar
to those of regressions 5 and 6; TSIZE, PMBA, PCPA, and MQFACT have a
positive and significant effect on the prevalence of ATPs in IPO firms.25
Both our univariate and multivariate tests of the relationship between man-
agement quality and the prevalence of ATPs in IPO firms show that firms with
higher quality managers have a significantly greater number of ATPs prior to
IPO. These findings support the long-term value creation hypothesis (hypothesis
1) and contradict the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
5.2. Relationship among Management Quality, Growth Options, and the
Prevalence of Antitakeover Provisions
The long-term value creation hypothesis predicts that stronger ATPs are more
likely to be adopted by higher quality managers of firms that have larger growth
options (firms with the greatest potential for long-term value creation) and are
less likely to be adopted by lower quality managers of firms that have smaller
growth options (firms with the smallest potential for long-term value creation;
hypothesis 2).
To study the interaction between management quality and growth options
and their impact on the prevalence of ATPs, we split our sample into four groups.
In group 1 we place firms with above median management quality factor score
(MQFACT) and above median growth options (CERDA). In group 2 we place
firms with above median management quality factor score and below median
growth options. In group 3 we place firms with below median management
quality factor score and above median growth options. Finally, in group 4 we
place firms with below median management quality factor score and below
median growth options. We create dummies for each group and use them as
independent variables (instead of management quality and growth option var-
iables) in equation (1).
Table 7 reports the results of Poisson maximum-likelihood regressions of the
total number of ATPs on the management quality and growth option group
dummies and control variables. In regression 1, we include only the dummy
variable for group 1. The coefficient estimate is positive and statistically significant
at the 5 percent level. This indicates that firms with higher management quality
25 We also investigated how management quality affects the likelihood of having individual ATPs
(these results are available on request). For example, MQFACT has a significant and positive influence
on the likelihood of IPO firms having a staggered board, a restriction on shareholders’ ability to call
shareholder meetings, an advance-notice requirement, and a supermajority requirement to remove
directors. These results confirm the positive relationship between management quality and the prev-
alence of ATPs in IPO firms’ corporate charters on both the aggregate and the individual provision
levels.
674 The Journal of LAW& ECONOMICS
Table 7
Relationship among Management Quality, Growth Options, and the Prevalence of
Antitakeover Provisions (ATPs) for Firms with Initial Public Offerings 1993–2000
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.371* (2.55) 1.240* (2.32)
GROUP1 .111* (2.44) .100* (2.13)
GROUP2 .066 (1.17) .068 (1.19)
GROUP3 .075 (1.34) .050 (.85)
GROUP4 .219** (3.75) .207** (3.45)
TENURE .003 (.67) .005 (1.11) .002 (.60) .004 (.86)
TENHET .004 (.58) .005 (.67) .007 (1.01) .008 (1.11)
INSIDERB .067 (.73) .071 (.77) .087 (.92) .090 (.95)
ODIR .007 (.10) .011 (.15) .058 (.74) .038 (.49)
BOSS .007 (.16) .002 (.06) .012 (.26) .005 (.11)
LNBVA .130** (8.21) .129** (8.08) .114** (6.90) .113** (6.76)
LEVERAGE .063 (1.16) .067 (1.25) .114 (1.93) .117* (1.99)
REP .379 (.72) .270 (.52) .629 (1.18) .530 (.99)
STATELAW .556** (5.91) .564** (5.97)
DELAWARE .040 (1.02) .035 (.88)
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes
N 711 711 707 707
Pseudo R2 .0871 .0898
Note. Coefficients are from Poisson maximum-likelihood regressions with the dependent variable equal to
the total number of ATPs (1–19 in Appendix A). All regressions include year and industry dummies.
GROUP1 through GROUP4 are dummy variables representing four management quality and growth option
groups. Values in parentheses are t-statistics.
 Statistically significant at the .10 level.
* Statistically significant at the .05 level.
** Statistically significant at the .01 level.
and larger growth options have a significantly greater number of ATPs than the
rest of the sample. This result is also economically significant. A firm with the
median number of four ATPs in groups 2, 3, and 4 will have .47 more ATPs if
moved to group 1; this represents an 11.7 percent increase over the median
number of ATPs.
In regression 2, we use group 2, 3, and 4 dummies. The coefficient estimates
of these dummies are.07,.08, and.22, respectively, and only the coefficient
estimate of the group 4 dummy is significant at the 1 percent level. This indicates
that firms in those groups have fewer ATPs than firms in group 1 and that firms
in group 4 have significantly fewer ATPs than firms in group 1. This result is
also economically significant. A firm with the median number of four ATPs in
group 1 will have .79 fewer ATPs if moved to group 4; this represents a 19.6
percent decrease over the median number of ATPs.
In regressions 3 and 4, we drop STATELAW and DELAWARE and estimate
state-of-incorporation fixed-effects models. The results are qualitatively similar
to those of regressions 1 and 2; the coefficient estimate of the group 1 dummy
is positive and significant in regression 3, and that of the group 4 dummy is
negative and significant in regression 4. Thus, our findings in Table 7 provide
support for hypothesis 2.
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5.3. Relationship among Management Quality, Antitakeover Provisions, and
Post–Initial Public Offering Operating Performance
The long-term value creation hypothesis predicts that firms with higher quality
managers that have a greater number of ATPs will use this protection to im-
plement long-term value-creating projects. Implementation of these projects will
be reflected in a better post-IPO operating performance for such firms compared
with the rest of the firms in the IPO sample (hypothesis 3). The managerial
entrenchment hypothesis, on the other hand, predicts that regardless of man-
agement quality, firms associated with a greater number of ATPs will be more
likely to have poorer post-IPO operating performance because of the loss-of-
discipline effect.
We use four measures of operating performance: OIBD/Assets, ROA, profit
margin, and OIBD/Sales, where OIBD is the operating income before depreci-
ation plus interest income (Compustat items 13 and 15), Assets are the book
value of total assets (item 6), ROA is the ratio of net income (item 172) over
assets, and profit margin is the ratio of net income over sales (item 12). We
further adjust these measures for industry performance by subtracting contem-
poraneous industry (two-digit SIC code) medians.
We split our sample into two roughly equal groups: firms with stronger an-
titakeover protection and firms with weaker antitakeover protection. Table 8
compares industry-adjusted median operating performance measures of firms
in these two groups for the year of IPO (year 0) and the subsequent 4 years.
Consistent with the findings in the previous literature, the operating perfor-
mance of all IPOs deteriorates in the years after the IPO, irrespective of the level
of antitakeover protection.26 However, firms with stronger antitakeover protec-
tion consistently and significantly outperform firms with weaker antitakeover
protection (median tests are significant at the 1 percent level) in all years after
the IPO. These results contradict the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
To test the hypothesis that higher quality managers use ATPs to ward off
unwanted takeovers and implement long-term value-creating projects (hypoth-
esis 3), we split our sample into two groups. In group A we place firms with
an above median management quality factor score and four or more ATPs. We
place the rest of the sample in group B. In other words, group A represents
firms with higher quality managers and stronger antitakeover protection. We
then compare the post-IPO operating performances of group A and group B.
Table 9 compares industry-adjusted median operating performance measures
of firms in group A with those of firms in group B for the year of IPO (year
0) and 4 years afterward. The median industry-adjusted operating performance
measures of firms in group A are consistently greater than those of firms in
26 See, for example, Jain and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson, Partch, and Shah (1997), who document
declining operating performance for IPO firms in the years after going public and provide various
explanations such as insiders timing their issues to follow periods of good performance, increased
agency costs, window dressing accounting numbers prior to going public, and increased asset base.
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Table 8
Relationship between Antitakeover Provisions (ATPs) and Post–Initial Public Offering







Performance Measure % N % N z-Statistic
OIBD/Assets 0 5.42 371 2.61 332 4.143**
OIBD/Assets 1 3.40 354 1.05 313 4.610**
OIBD/Assets 2 3.59 319 1.18 282 4.289**
OIBD/Assets 3 3.54 294 .76 262 4.409**
OIBD/Assets 4 3.39 259 .85 225 3.090**
ROA 0 4.56 371 2.78 332 3.278**
ROA 1 3.10 355 .33 314 4.484**
ROA 2 2.09 320 .85 283 4.316**
ROA 3 2.66 295 1.03 265 5.153**
ROA 4 1.73 261 .03 227 3.344**
Profit margin 0 2.88 369 1.98 325 3.271**
Profit margin 1 2.27 355 .02 311 4.035**
Profit margin 2 1.44 319 .89 282 4.057**
Profit margin 3 2.08 294 1.00 261 5.333**
Profit margin 4 1.30 261 .24 225 3.384**
OIBD/Sales 0 4.25 369 1.37 325 4.272**
OIBD/Sales 1 3.04 354 .56 310 4.120**
OIBD/Sales 2 2.65 318 1.40 281 4.679**
OIBD/Sales 3 3.54 293 .23 259 4.584**
OIBD/Sales 4 2.21 259 .00 222 3.706**
Note. Values are median levels of industry-adjusted operating performance of IPO firms by the prevalence
of ATPs. Firms with stronger antitakeover protection have four or more ATPs; firms with weaker antitakeover
protection have three or fewer ATPs. All performance measures are adjusted for industry performance by
subtracting contemporaneous industry (two-digit Security Industry Classification code) medians. Year 0 is
the year of IPO. Significance levels are based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in medians.
** Significant at the .01 level.
group B in the year of IPO and all of the following 4 years across all four
measures of operating performance. Firms in group A significantly outperform
firms in group B in at least 3 out of 5 years after the IPO (including the year
of IPO). For example, firms in group A significantly outperform firms in group
B in years 0, 3, and 4 based on ROA, profit margin, and OIBD/Sales measures
and in years 1, 3, and 4 based on the OIBD/Assets measure.
These results provide support for the long-term value creation hypothesis
(hypothesis 3). Along with our results from Section 5.2, where we presented
evidence that higher management quality firms use a greater number of ATPs
in their corporate charters when they have long-term value-increasing projects
(larger growth options), these results suggest that IPO firms with higher quality
managers use ATPs to protect themselves against potential takeovers and im-
plement long-term value-creating projects, thus obtaining better post-IPO op-
erating performance than the rest of the IPO firms.
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Table 9
Relationship among Management Quality, Antitakeover Provisions (ATPs), and Post–Initial
Public Offering (IPO) Operating Performance for Firms with IPOs 1993–2000
Group A Group B
Difference in
Performance Measure % N % N Medians z-Statistic
OIBD/Assets 0 4.55 202 3.98 494 1.413
OIBD/Assets 1 3.40 190 1.38 469 1.955
OIBD/Assets 2 1.85 168 .92 426 1.439
OIBD/Assets 3 3.50 155 1.35 395 2.205*
OIBD/Assets 4 3.46 133 1.64 345 1.650
ROA 0 4.21 202 3.27 494 1.752
ROA 1 2.87 191 1.49 470 1.353
ROA 2 1.77 168 .63 428 1.092
ROA 3 2.88 155 .57 399 2.555*
ROA 4 1.88 134 .65 348 1.972*
Profit margin 0 3.09 201 2.31 487 2.215*
Profit margin 1 1.78 191 1.14 467 .566
Profit margin 2 1.18 167 .31 427 .615
Profit margin 3 2.31 154 .19 396 2.849**
Profit margin 4 1.92 134 .28 346 1.783
OIBD/Sales 0 4.91 201 2.51 487 2.653**
OIBD/Sales 1 2.51 190 1.03 466 1.514
OIBD/Sales 2 2.20 167 .24 425 1.465
OIBD/Sales 3 3.32 154 .73 393 2.417*
OIBD/Sales 4 2.03 133 .95 342 1.719
Note. Values are median levels of industry-adjusted operating performance of IPO firms. Group A rep-
resents firms with above median management quality factor scores and four or more ATPs. Group B
represents the rest of the sample. All performance measures are adjusted for industry performance by
subtracting contemporaneous industry (two-digit Security Industry Classification code) medians. Year 0 is
the year of IPO. Significance levels are based on the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the difference in medians.
 Significant at the .10 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
5.4. Relationship among Management Quality, Antitakeover Provisions,
and Initial Public Offering Firm Valuation
According to the long-term value creation hypothesis, IPO firms with a greater
number of ATPs and higher management quality will receive a higher valuation
at the IPO stage than will the rest of the sample (hypothesis 4), since the market
perceives that such firms will use antitakeover protection to implement long-
term value-creating projects. In contrast, the managerial entrenchment hypoth-
esis predicts that, regardless of management quality, IPO firms with a greater
number of ATPs will receive a lower IPO valuation since ATPs tend to entrench
management at the expense of firm shareholders.
We measure IPO firm valuation by Tobin’s q, which is the ratio of the market
value of assets to the book value of assets, where the market value of assets is
equal to the book value of assets minus the book value of common equity plus
the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the IPO offer price. We also
use industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, which is the difference between the IPO firm’s
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Tobin’s q and the median of its two-digit SIC code industry peers. We measure
Tobin’s q for industry peers the same way as for IPO firms and calculate their
market value of assets using the share price at the end of the issue month. The
book value of assets, the book value of equity, and the number of shares out-
standing for both IPO firms and industry peers are taken from the first available
post-IPO quarter on Compustat.
We run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of IPO firms’ Tobin’s q and
industry-adjusted Tobin’s q on ATP or ATPDUM and other control variables,
where ATP is the total number of ATPs (1–19 in Appendix A) and ATPDUM
is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm has four or more ATPs and zero
otherwise. Table 10 reports the results of these regressions. The coefficient es-
timates of ATP and ATPDUM are positive in all specifications, although not
statistically significant. These findings indicate that, although there is a positive
relationship between the strength of antitakeover protection and IPO firm val-
uation, ATPs alone do not significantly influence IPO firm valuation and thus
do not provide support for the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.
We test the long-term value creation hypothesis (hypothesis 4) by running
OLS regressions of IPO firms’ Tobin’s q and industry-adjusted Tobin’s q on
GROUPADUM and control variables, where GROUPADUM is a dummy variable
equal to one for firms with above median management quality factor scores and
four or more ATPs (in other words, GROUPADUM is equal to one for firms
in group A as described in Section 5.3) and zero for the rest of the sample. Table
11 reports the results of these regressions. In regression 1, where we use Tobin’s
q as a dependent variable, GROUPADUM has a positive coefficient estimate of
.22, which is significant at the 5 percent level. This indicates that IPO valuations
of firms in group A are significantly larger (by .22) than those of firms in group
B. This difference represents a 9 percent increase over the median Tobin’s q.
In regression 2, where we use industry-adjusted Tobin’s q as a dependent
variable, GROUPADUM has a positive coefficient estimate of .20, which is sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level. This indicates that IPO valuations of firms in
group A are significantly larger than those of firms in group B by .20. This
difference represents a 28 percent increase over the median industry-adjusted
Tobin’s q.
In regressions 3 and 4, we drop STATELAW and DELAWARE and estimate
state-of-incorporation fixed-effects models. The results are qualitatively similar
to those of regressions 1 and 2; the coefficient estimates of GROUPADUM are
positive and significant at the 10 percent level.
These results provide support for the long-term value creation hypothesis and
indicate that firms with higher management quality and a greater number of
ATPs receive a significantly higher valuation at the time of IPO than does the
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Table 11
Relationship among Management Quality, Antitakeover Provisions (ATPs), and Initial











Constant 3.802** (2.93) 4.150** (6.95) 4.032** (3.05) 3.990** (6.46)
GROUPADUM .221* (2.15) .202* (2.05) .182 (1.69) .173 (1.68)
TENURE .018 (1.88) .016 (1.80) .019 (1.92) .020* (2.05)
TENHET .021 (1.24) .026 (1.72) .018 (1.00) .024 (1.49)
CERDA .374** (3.29) .251* (2.18) .487** (3.85) .313* (2.41)
INSIDERB .131 (.61) .239 (1.17) .045 (.20) .227 (1.06)
ODIR .115 (.66) .103 (.61) .154 (.84) .133 (.75)
BOSS .025 (.25) .005 (.05) .059 (.55) .027 (.26)
LNBVA .177** (4.73) .191** (5.64) .189** (4.79) .198** (5.52)
LEVERAGE .107 (.91) .061 (.53) .172 (1.41) .087 (.73)
REP 4.830** (3.50) 5.086** (3.89) 4.925** (3.48) 5.259** (3.93)
STATELAW .046 (.27) .347* (2.09)
DELAWARE .115 (1.23) .127 (1.38)
State fixed effects No No Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes No Yes No
Industry dummies Yes No Yes No
Pseudo R2 .3189 .1100 .3194 .1055
Note. Coefficients are the results of ordinary least squares regressions with Tobin’s q and industry-adjusted
Tobin’s q as dependent variables. Tobin’s q and industry-adjusted Tobin’s q are winsorized at the 99th
percentile. Values in parentheses are t-statistics. .Np 704
 Significant at the .10 level.
* Significant at the .05 level.
** Significant at the .01 level.
5.5. Relationship among Management Quality, Antitakeover Provisions, and
Post–Initial Public Offering Stock Return Performance
The long-term value creation hypothesis predicts that firms with higher quality
managers and stronger antitakeover protection will use such defenses to imple-
ment long-term value-creating projects. This will be reflected in a better post-
IPO stock return performance for such firms (hypothesis 5). In contrast, the
managerial entrenchment hypothesis predicts that regardless of management
quality, firms with stronger antitakeover protection will have poorer post-IPO
long-term stock returns because of the loss-of-discipline effect.
We study stock return performance of IPO firms relative to various bench-
marks: NASDAQ equal- and value-weighted indices, CRSP equal- and value-
weighted indices, and the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. We calculate a 5-year
holding period return for each IPO firm and corresponding benchmarks. We
define a year as 12 intervals of 21 trading days (252 days). Holding period returns
for each firm and a corresponding benchmark are calculated as [ (1tp1Ti
percent, where Rit is the return on IPO firm stock i or a cor-R ) 1]# 100it
responding benchmark on the t-th day of the 5-year event window and Ti is the
number of trading days in the event window. The term Ti is equal to 1,260 if
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an IPO firm survives for 5 years after the issue. For firms that were delisted
before the end of the 5-year window, the holding period return is calculated
until the delisting date, and the corresponding benchmark’s return is calculated
over the same truncated period. The first day after the issue date is t p 1. We
do not include the issue day return (that is, initial return or underpricing), as
it is frequently difficult for an ordinary investor to buy a share of an IPO firm
at the offering price.27 Finally, we calculate the abnormal holding period return
for each firm by subtracting the 5-year holding period return of the correspond-
ing benchmark from the 5-year holding period return of the IPO firm.
We split our sample into two groups as in the case of operating performance
(firms with stronger antitakeover protection, or those with four or more ATPs,
and firms with weaker antitakeover protection, or those with three or less ATPs)
and test the differences in abnormal holding period returns between the two
groups.
In Table 12 we report the mean and median 5-year holding period returns
for IPO firms and corresponding benchmarks split into two groups by the prev-
alence of ATPs. Consistent with the findings in the previous literature, IPO firms
underperform corresponding benchmarks in 5 years after going public since
both the mean and median holding period returns of IPO firms are less than
those of corresponding benchmarks (see, for example, Ritter 1991; Loughran
and Ritter 1995; Brav and Gompers 1997; Teoh, Welch, and Wong 1998). How-
ever, both the mean and median abnormal holding period returns of IPO firms
with stronger antitakeover protection are significantly larger than those of IPO
firms with weaker antitakeover protection. The differences in mean abnormal
holding period returns are statistically significant at the 10 percent level, and the
differences in median abnormal holding period returns are significant at the 1
and 5 percent levels. These results contradict the managerial entrenchment
hypothesis.
To test the long-term value creation hypothesis (hypothesis 5), we divide our
sample into two groups, A and B, as described in Section 5.3. In group A we
place firms with above median management quality factor score and with four
or more ATPs. We place the rest of the sample in group B. Thus, firms in group
A have higher quality managers and stronger ATPs. In Table 13, we report the
mean and median 5-year holding period returns for IPO firms and corresponding
benchmarks. We find that IPO firms in group A have consistently larger abnormal
holding period returns than IPO firms in group B across all benchmarks. The
differences in mean abnormal holding period returns are significant at the 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels depending on the benchmark used, and the differences in
median abnormal holding period returns are all significant at the 1 percent level.
These results indicate that firms in group A have better post-IPO stock return
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performance than firms in group B and provide support for the long-term value
creation hypothesis (hypothesis 5).28
In summary, our results on post-IPO stock return performance provide sup-
port for the long-term value creation hypothesis and contradict the managerial
entrenchment hypothesis.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we shed new light on the role of ATPs in firms going public by
analyzing the relationship between the quality and reputation of a firm’s man-
agement and the prevalence of ATPs in the corporate charters of IPO firms.
Using hand-collected data on the quality of the management teams of firms
going public and on the ATPs in their corporate charters, we study the rela-
tionship among management quality, ATPs, and post-IPO performance and IPO
valuation for the first time in the literature. We test the implications of two
theories: the managerial entrenchment hypothesis, which implies that ATPs are
meant mainly to enhance the control benefits of existing firm management by
minimizing the probability of takeovers by rival management teams and therefore
always reduce shareholder value, and the long-term value creation hypothesis,
which argues that such provisions, while they entrench firm management, can
also be value enhancing in the hands of higher quality managers, since they
allow such managers to create superior long-term value for the firm without
paying undue attention to short-term pressures arising from the market for
corporate control.
Our empirical results are as follows. First, firms with higher quality managers
are associated with a greater number of ATPs than are those with lower quality
managers. Second, within the high-management-quality category, firms with
larger growth options are associated with a greater number of ATPs compared
with all other firms. Third, regardless of management quality, firms with a greater
number of ATPs outperform those with a smaller number of ATPs, in terms of
both post-IPO operating and post-IPO stock return performance. Fourth, if we
divide our sample of IPO firms into four categories—those with higher or lower
management quality and those with a greater or a smaller number of ATPs
within each management quality category—firms with higher management qual-
ity and a greater number of ATPs have better post-IPO operating and post-IPO
stock return performance and higher IPO valuation than firms in the remaining
28 We also study long-term post-IPO stock return performance by using 5-year wealth relatives
for portfolios of IPO firms and corresponding benchmarks. (These results are available on request.)
Wealth relatives are calculated as a ratio of the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of
IPO firms to the end-of-period wealth from holding a portfolio of a corresponding benchmark. Our
findings using wealth relatives are consistent with those reported in Tables 12 and 13. In particular,
IPO firms with stronger antitakeover protection have larger wealth relatives across all benchmarks
than do IPO firms with weaker antitakeover protection, and IPO firms in group A have consistently
larger wealth relatives than do IPO firms in group B across all benchmarks.
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three categories. These findings contradict the managerial entrenchment hy-
pothesis and support the long-term value creation hypothesis.
Thus, in contrast to much of the literature on the role of ATPs in corporate
charters in the context of IPOs and other corporate events, the evidence presented
here indicates that having stronger ATPs in a firm’s corporate charter does not
necessarily destroy shareholder value. The evidence emerging from our empirical
analysis indicates that ATPs play a more nuanced role in affecting shareholder
value: while a greater number of ATPs may indeed destroy shareholder value in
the hands of poorer quality management (possibly by entrenching it more
strongly), our analysis indicates that ATPs are value enhancing in the hands of
higher quality firm management. Thus, by incorporating the role of management
quality into our empirical analysis, we provide a more complete picture of the
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